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Abstract 
People high in negative affect tend to think negative events are more likely than positive 
events (‘probability bias’).  Studies have found that weak attentional control exaggerates 
another negative affect-related cognitive bias – attentional bias – but it is not clear why this 
might be.  We therefore wanted to know whether weak attentional control would be related to 
probability bias too.  Four studies, with predominantly female student samples (N = 857), 
revealed correlations of around -.38 between attentional control and probability bias.  This 
remained significant when trait anxiety and depression were controlled; there were no 
interactions between attentional control and negative affect.  Studies 3 and 4 found that 
attentional control’s relationship with probability bias was partly mediated by emotion 
regulation ability.  These results suggest attentional control is important for regulating affect-
related cognitive biases, and for emotion regulation in general.  Furthermore, because 
cognitive biases are thought to be important for maintaining emotional disorders, these results 
are also consistent with weak attentional control being a risk factor for these disorders.   
 
Keywords: Probability bias; attentional control; trait anxiety; depression; negative affect 
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Attentional Control and Estimation of the Probability of Positive and Negative Events 
 
People high in negative affect, such as anxiety or depression, show cognitive biases 
concerning their processing of negative information (e.g. Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 
1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).  This article examines the relationship between one of 
these biases, probability bias, and attentional control.   
Probability Bias 
Probability bias is the tendency to think negative events are more likely than positive 
events.  It reliably correlates with trait anxiety in adults (Butler & Mathews, 1987; Mitte, 
2007; Stöber, 1997) and children (Canterbury et al., 2004; Muris & van der Heiden, 2006).  It 
has also been reported in patients with generalised anxiety disorder (Butler & Mathews, 
1983; Dalgleish, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Canterbury, & Yule, 2003), social anxiety disorder 
(Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; Gilboa-Schechtman, Franklin, & Foa, 2000; 
McManus, Clark, & Hackmann, 2000; Voncken, Bögels, & de Vries, 2003), agoraphobia 
(McNally & Foa, 1987; Poulton & Andrews, 1996), height-phobia (Menzies & Clarke, 1995), 
and acute stress disorder (Smith & Bryant, 2000; Warda & Bryant, 1998).  It has also been 
reported in nonclinical high-depression students (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Butler & Mathews, 
1987; although see Mitte, 2007; Stöber, 1997) and children (Muris & van der Heiden, 2006), 
and in patients with major depression (Butler & Mathews, 1983).   
Probability bias is very relevant for understanding emotional disorders and their 
aetiology, because it is clearly relevant to worry, the key diagnostic symptom of anxiety 
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013): indeed, it correlates with trait worry 
(Constans, 2001; A. K. MacLeod, Williams, & Bekerian, 1991).  Foa and Kozak (1986) 
suggested probability bias is a primary cognitive feature of anxiety disorders (see also Grupe 
& Nitschke, 2013), and is important for their maintenance.  Probability bias has been shown 
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to improve during cognitive behaviour therapy (Benbow & Anderson, 2019; Foa et al., 1996).  
However, the relationship between probability bias and attentional control has never been 
studied.   
Attentional Control and Negative Affect  
We examined the relationship between probability bias and attentional control 
because poor attentional control exaggerates the expression of another negatıve affect-related 
cognitive bias: attentional bias.  Derryberry and Reed (2002), Lonigan and Vasey (2009), 
Helzer, Connor-Smith, and Reed (2009), and Susa, Benga, Pitică, and Miclea (2014) have all 
found that people higher in negative affect were more likely to attend to threatening stimuli 
than neutral stimuli, but only if they were also low in attentional control, which they assessed 
using Derryberry and Reed’s Attentional Control Scale.  Booth, Mackintosh and Sharma 
(2017) and Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg, and Bradley (2009) found similar results using 
behavioural operationalisations of attentional control.   
Based on this evidence, one could conclude that weak attentional control might be a 
risk factor for emotional disorders (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; see also Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009).  This is because 
attentional bias is thought to maintain, or even cause, high negative affect (Browning, 
Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012; C. MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, 
& Holker, 2002): weak attentional control is related to clinical symptoms and behavioural 
issues in emotional disorders (de Panfilis, Meehan, Cain, & Clarkin, 2013; Mills et al., 2016; 
Muris, 2006; Muris, Meesters, & Rompelberg, 2007).   
However, one issue with this conclusion is that there are multiple reasons why weak 
attentional control might exaggerate attentional bias.  Attentional bias can be considered a 
failure of selective attention (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007): attention is 
focused on task-relevant cues, and is then captured by task-irrelevant threat cues.  Poor 
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attentional control is likely to exaggerate any such failure.  At the same time, attentional 
control might play a more direct role in the expression of cognitive biases, because 
attentional control has been implicated in emotion regulation and expression (Koole, van 
Dillen, & Sheppes, 2011; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Ouimet et al., 2009).  Attentional 
control, and its close correlate working memory capacity, have been found to be related to 
regulation of emotion (Schmeichel, 2007; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993) and responses to 
emotional stimuli (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008; Schmeichel, 
Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008).  So people with weak attentional control might show a more 
exaggerated emotional response to threatening stimuli, which might cause them to show a 
larger attentional bias (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003).   
In other words, it is not clear why attentional control influences the expression of 
attentional bias, and therefore it is not clear whether, and how, weak attentional control 
increases the risk of emotional disorders.  Studies on attentional control and interpretive bias, 
another cognitive bias associated with negative affect, have yielded inconsistent results 
(Booth et al., 2017; Muris et al., 2007; Salemink, Friese, Drake, Mackintosh, & Hoppitt, 
2013; Salemink & Wiers, 2012; see also Booth et al., 2019), so it may be that this effect is 
specific to attentional bias, and does not apply to other cognitive biases.  Given its relevance 
for worry, probability bias may be at least as important in the aetiology of negative affect 
than attentional bias (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013), so we wanted to know 
whether it was related to weak attentional control in a similar way.  If so, this would support 
the idea that weak attentional control is a general risk factor for emotional disorders.   
The Present Studies 
We tested, for the first time, attentional control’s relationship with probability bias.  
Based on the literature above, we predicted that weak attentional control would correlate with 
probability bias, and/or would exaggerate the relationship between negative affect and 
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL AND PROBABILITY BIAS  6 
 
probability bias.  Because we wanted to compare our results to those of the attentional bias 
studies reviewed above, we used the same self-report measure of attentional control that most 
of these studies used, the Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; see General 
Discussion).  We examined this in four samples of predominantly young, female stude nts.  
To foreshadow the results, in Studies 1 and 2 we found that weak attentional control reliably 
predicted probability bias.  Based on these results, in Studies 3 and 4 we investigated whether 
attentional control’s relationship with probability bias was mediated by emotion regulation 
ability.   
Study 1 
All studies were approved by the Psychology Ethics Committee at the University of 
Kent, and were planned to achieve at least .80 power to detect a relationship of f
2
 = .03.  Data 
may be retrieved from http://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/8WV7X.  In Study 1, we assessed 
attentional control, trait anxiety, depression, and probability bias.   
Method  
Participants and procedure.  Two hundred and forty-three undergraduates from the 
University of Kent participated for course credit.  Participants were told the study was about 
predictors of estimation ability, and completed the scales online.  Five participants were 
excluded for reporting a current psychiatric diagnosis other than an anxiety or affective 
disorder, leaving a final sample of 238 (35 males; Mage = 19.25, SDage = 2.07; 195 identified 
themselves as British).  
Measures.  Participants first completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), which includes two 20-item 
subscales assessing how participants feel 'right now, at this moment' (state anxiety, STAI-S) 
and how they feel 'generally, in [their] life' (trait anxiety, STAI-T).  Participants respond on a 
1-4 scale.  State items include ‘I am tense’ and ‘I feel nervous’; trait items include ‘I worry 
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL AND PROBABILITY BIAS  7 
 
too much over something that really doesn’t matter’ and ‘I have disturbing thoughts.’  
Internal consistency of both scales was good; see Table 1 for Cronbach’s α for all predictors.   
Participants next completed the Beck Anxiety Inventory - Trait (BAIT; Kohn, Kantor, 
DeCicco, & Beck, 2008), which asks participants to rate how often they are ‘bothered’ by 21 
cognitive and somatic symptoms on a day-to-day basis, on a 0-3 scale.  Symptoms include 
‘nervous’, ‘fear of dying’ and ‘feeling of choking.’  We included this because the specificity 
of the STAI has been questioned (e.g. Bados, Gómez-Benito, & Balaguer, 2010); however, 
the results for the two scales are very similar across all four studies, so we focus on the STAI.   
Participants next completed the Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 
2002), which asks participants how often 20 statements apply to them.  They respond on a 1-
4 scale.  Items include ‘I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once’ and ‘When I am 
working hard on something, I still get distracted by events around me.’   
Next, we presented the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996).  Participants read 21 groups of four statements, and must choose the one statement 
which ‘best describes the way [they] have been feeling during the past two weeks.’  Each 
group of statements measures the severity of a particular cognitive or somatic symptom of 
depression, including sadness, loss of pleasure, and changes in sleeping pattern.   
Participants then completed the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (MCSD; 
Crowne & Marlowe, 1964).  This presents 33 statements such as ‘I have never intensely 
disliked anyone’ and ‘I am always willing to admit it when I make a mistake’, and asks 
participants whether each statement is true of them.  We routinely include this control 
variable in our studies because participants may not be honest about their negative affect.  In 
these studies the scale showed less-than-ideal psychometric performance so we did not 
include it in our analyses, but we do include it in Tables 1-4.   
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL AND PROBABILITY BIAS  8 
 
Finally, participants completed our measure of probability bias.  Twenty positive 
events, such as ‘You will become well-known for an outstanding accomplishment’, and 20 
negative events, such as ‘The next exam you sit will be unusually hard’, were presented in a 
random order.  These were partly adaptations of events used in previous studies (Butler & 
Mathews, 1987; Stöber, 1997), and partly original events (see Appendix).  While we would 
normally prefer to use a validated instrument, probability bias has always been measured by 
self-report, with individual research groups usually creating their own instrument; so we did 
the same.  The advantage of this is that events can be presented which are particularly 
relevant for the test population – in our case, UK students.  For each event, participants were 
first asked ‘What is the probability that this would happen to you?’  They answered on verbal 
Likert scales (Mitte, 2007; see also Nesse & Klaas, 1994).  There were seven response 
options: ‘Would never happen to me’; ‘Would probably not happen to me’; ‘Might not 
happen to me’; ‘Might happen, might not’; ‘Might happen to me’; ‘Would probably happen 
to me’; and ‘Would definitely happen to me.’  For analysis, these were assigned scores of 1-7 
respectively.  Probability bias was calculated as the participant’s mean probability for 
negative events minus their mean probability for positive events.  We simultaneously 
measured cost bias, the tendency to think negative events would affect one’s life more than 
positive events.  Results concerning cost bias were inconsistent between Studies 1 and 2, so 
we abandoned it and, for want of space, do not discuss it further in this article.  See Tables 1 
and 2 for basic results, and the Supplemental Materials for discussion.   
Results  
Bivariate correlations are presented in Table 1.  Trait anxiety, state anxiety, and 
depression positively predicted probability bias.  Importantly, attentional control negatively 
predicted probability bias: it showed a positive relationship with the perceived probability of 
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positive events, and a similar-sized negative relationship with the perceived probability of 
negative events.   
We wanted to check that attentional control’s relationship with probability bias was 
not an artefact of the relationship between attentional control and anxiety or depression (see 
General Discussion).  To investigate this, probability bias was regressed on STAI-T trait 
anxiety and depression, with attentional control entered in a second block.  The first block 
model was significant, R = .59, R
2
 = .34, F (2, 235) = 61.37, p < .001.  Both trait anxiety, 
standardised β = .44, t (235) = 5.95, p < .001, and depression, β = .18, t (235) = 2.40, p = .02, 
significantly predicted probability bias.  Adding attentional control significantly improved 
model fit, β = .13, R2 change = .013, Fchange (1, 234) = 4.88, p = .03 (multicollinearity 
tolerances > 0.48), showing that the relationship between attentional control and probability 
bias is independent of anxiety and depression.   
In the literature, attentional control moderates the relationship between negative affect 
and attentional bias, so moderated regression was used to check for any interaction between 
trait anxiety or depression and attentional control.  Probability bias was first regressed on 
mean-centred trait anxiety and attentional control, with their interaction entered in a second 
step.  The interaction did not significantly improve model fit, R
2
 change = .002, F (1, 234) = 
0.86, p = .35, indicating there was no interaction between the predictors.  We repeated this 
analysis as a Bayesian linear regression, using JASP (JASP Team, 2018).  This approach 
allows one to calculate how much more likely the observed data are if the tested effect is 
absent in the population, relative to if the tested effect is present in the population (BF01).  
The evidence for the interaction’s being absent was much stronger than the evidence for it 
being present, BF01 = 5.08.  The same analyses were repeated with depression replacing trait 
anxiety: again, adding the interaction term did not improve model fit, R
2
 change = .004, 
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Fchange (1, 234) = 1.37, p = .24, and there was good evidence that no interaction was present, 
BF01 = 3.47.   
Discussion  
Attentional control negatively predicted probability bias. However, this was 
independent of, and did not interact with, negative affect (anxiety and depression).   
These results show for the first time that attentional control is important for the 
regulation of probability bias.  They join findings on attentional biases (Booth et al., 2017; 
Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2009) in suggesting a general role for 
attentional control in cognitive biases, and in the processing of emotional information.  Since 
cognitive biases are thought to help cause and/or maintain anxiety (C. MacLeod et al., 2002), 
these findings reinforce the idea that weaker attentional control may be a risk factor for 
anxiety disorders.   
Study 2 
It is possible the results of Study 1 do not reflect a probability bias per se, but rather a 
tendency to endorse negative items more than positive items.  We thought it was important to 
confirm our interpretation of Study 1’s results.  Study 2, therefore, replicated Study 1 except 
that we also asked participants about the probability of positive and negative events 
happening to a peer from their class at university.  Typically, anxious or depressed people 
think negative events are more likely to happen to themselves, but are not necessarily more 
likely to happen to other people (e.g. Butler & Mathews, 1987; Canterbury et al., 2004; Muris 
& van der Heiden, 2006), so if our interpretation of Study 1’s results is correct, attentional 
control should predict probability bias referenced to the participants themselves, but not 
probability bias referenced to the peer.   
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Method  
Participants and procedure.  One hundred and ninety-one undergraduates from the 
University of Kent participated for course credit.  Six were excluded for reporting a current 
psychiatric diagnosis other than an anxiety or affective disorder, leaving a final sample of 185 
(156 females, 27 males, 1 other, and 1 did not report their gender; Mage = 20.39, SDage = 5.38; 
150 identified as British).   
Measures. These were the same as for Study 1, except for the bias measure.  This 
asked participants about 20 positive and 20 negative events as before, but was split into two 
halves.  In the first half, participants were instructed to rate the probability of each event 
happening to themselves as before, and their answers were used to calculate probability bias 
for the self.  For the second half, participants were told: “Imagine you have a friend in your 
class, called Sam. Sam is a typical student in your class. In this part of the study, you must 
estimate the probability of various events happening to Sam, and how much they would 
affect Sam's life if they did. Please answer each question truthfully, without overthinking it.”  
All 40 events were then presented again, in a newly-randomised order, and participants rated 
the probability of each event happening to ‘Sam’ (see Butler & Mathews, 1987).  ‘Sam’ is 
gender-ambiguous in English.  These items were used to calculate probability bias for a peer.   
Results  
Correlations and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.  State anxiety, trait 
anxiety, and depression predicted probability bias for the self; none of these variables 
predicted probability bias for a peer.  Most importantly, attentional control negatively 
predicted probability bias for the self, replicating Study 1.   
Again, we regressed probability bias for the self on trait anxiety (STAI-T) and 
depression, with attentional control entered in a second block.  The first block model was 
significant, R = .58, R
2
 = .33, F (2, 182) = 45.59, p < .001.  Both trait anxiety, standardised β 
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= .27, t (182) = 3.02, p = .003, and depression, β = .35, t (182) = 3.99, p < .001, significantly 
predicted probability bias.  Adding attentional control significantly improved model fit, β = -
.24, R
2
 change = .05, Fchange (1, 181) = 13.15, p < .001 (multicollinearity tolerances > 0.43), 
showing that the relationship between attentional control and probability bias is independent 
of anxiety and depression.   
Moderated regression was used to check for any interaction between trait anxiety and 
attentional control.  Probability bias for the self was regressed on mean-centred trait anxiety 
(STAI-T) and attentional control, with their interaction entered in a second step.  The 
interaction did not improve model fit, R
2
 change = .002, Fchange (1, 181) = 0.50, p = .48, BF01 
= 5.23.  The same analyses were then repeated, with depression replacing trait anxiety.  
Again, the interaction term did not improve model fit, R
2
 change = .001, Fchange (1, 181) = 
0.28, p = .60, BF01 = 6.11.   
Discussion  
Study 2 replicated Study 1, finding that attentional control and negative affect (trait 
anxiety and depression) independently predicted probability bias.  Again, there was no 
interaction.  Importantly, attentional control only predicted probability bias regarding the 
participants' selves, and was not related to their probability estimates regarding another 
person.  This suggests attentional control really does predict probability bias, not merely the 
tendency to endorse negative items.   
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 present good evidence that weak attentional control is related to 
probability bias.  However, at this stage it is unclear why this might be.  The most obvious 
explanation is that attentional control plays a role in emotion regulation (e.g. Koole et al., 
2011); therefore people with weaker attentional control might show a stronger emotional 
response to potential risk, and so find it harder to perceive positive events as likely and 
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negative events as unlikely.  Such perceptions would be adaptive, as they would protect from 
excessive worry and help maintain motivation.  As a first step towards testing these 
hypotheses, we tested whether the relationship between attentional control and probability 
bias was mediated by emotion regulation ability.  Studies 3 and 4 tested this using two 
different measures of emotion regulation.  To foreshadow the results, we found that emotion 
regulation partly, but not entirely, explained the relationship between attentional control and 
probability bias.   
Emotion regulation is a broad concept (Koole, 2009), incorporating various cognitions 
and behaviours which individuals may utilise across varying timescales.  In this study, we 
chose to focus on cognitions which people might have in negative situations, since these 
seemed most likely to depend on attentional control.  We used the Cognitive Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ, Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2002), which specifically 
measures these cognitions.   
Method  
Participants and procedure.  Two hundred and fifteen undergraduates from the 
University of Kent participated for course credit.  Fourteen were excluded for reporting a 
current psychiatric diagnosis other than an anxiety or affective disorder, leaving a final 
sample of 201 (179 females, 22 males; Mage = 19.04, SDage = 1.61; 158 identified as British).   
Measures.  Participants completed the STAI-T, BAIT, ACS, and BDI; then they 
completed the CERQ, our probability bias measure from Study 1, and finally the MCSD.   
The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ, Garnefski et al., 2002) 
consists of 36 items, addressing what the respondent thinks (not what they do) when 
confronted with negative or unpleasant situations; items include “I feel that I am the one who 
is responsible for what has happened”, and “I think about how I can best cope with the 
situation.”  Participants indicate how often they employ each type of thought, on a 1 (“almost 
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never”) to 5 (“almost always”) scale.  The 36 items assess nine distinct emotion regulation 
strategies, both adaptive (‘protective’) and maladaptive (‘symptom promoting’): self-blame, 
acceptance, rumination, positive refocusing, refocusing on planning, positive reappraisal, 
putting into perspective, catastrophising, and blaming others.  In this study, we wanted to test 
a relatively simple mediation model where emotion regulation ability was modelled as a 
mediator between attentional control and probability bias, so we summed all 36 items – 
reversing those intended to measure maladaptive strategies – to yield an overall cognitive 
emotion regulation score.  Although the scale was not intended to be used in this way, the 
total scale showed good internal consistency (see Table 3).  Please see the Supplementary 
Materials for basic results with the CERQ subscales.   
Results  
Correlations are presented in Table 3.  Once again, attentional control correlated 
negatively with probability bias.  Overall cognitive emotion regulation scores correlated 
positively with attentional control, and negatively with probability bias and all the 
psychopathology measures.   
We tested a mediation model using PROCESS (Hayes, 2017) to see whether 
attentional control’s relationship with probability bias – controlling anxiety and depression – 
was mediated by cognitive emotion regulation.  The indirect effect was estimated using 
ordinary least squares, and its confidence interval was estimated by bootstrapping with 
10,000 resamples.  There was a significant indirect effect of attentional control on probability 
bias via emotion regulation, standardised β = -.04, 95% CI [-.112, -.007], but the direct effect 
of attentional control on probability bias was also significant, β = -.14, t (196) = -2.10, p = .04 
(multicollinearity tolerances > 0.34).  This means that although emotion regulation does 
partly explain the relationship between attentional control and probability bias, attentional 
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control still significantly predicts probability bias even when emotion regulation, trait anxiety 
and depression are simultaneously controlled.   
Finally, we again checked whether attentional control moderated trait anxiety or 
depression’s relationships with probability bias.  For the model with trait anxiety, adding the 
interaction term did not improve model fit, R
2
 change = .001, Fchange (1, 197) = 0.42, p = .52, 
BF01 = 5.93.  For the model with depression, again adding the interaction term did not 
improve model fit, R
2
 change = .006, Fchange (1, 197) = 1.54, p = .22, BF01 = 2.81.   
Discussion  
Once again, weak attentional control was related to probability bias, and this 
relationship was independent of anxiety and depression.  Cognitive emotion regulation partly 
explained this link – weaker attentional control was related to poorer emotion regulation, 
which was related to greater probability bias – but a direct relationship between attentional 
control and probability bias remained.   
These results show that the relationship between attentional control and probability 
bias is complex.  While it is true that attentional control helps regulate cognitions in negative 
situations and so affects risk perceptions, attentional control may also regulate risk 
perceptions directly.  If probability bias helps to maintain anxiety and depression (Foa & 
Kozak, 1986) as other cognitive biases do (Browning et al., 2012; C. MacLeod et al., 2002), 
these results reinforce the importance of weak attentional control as a risk factor for 
emotional disorders.   
Study 4 
Study 4 sought to replicate the findings of Study 3, using a different measure of 
emotion regulation.  The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS, Gratz & Roemer, 
2004) specifically measures clinically relevant emotion regulation difficulties.  Again, given 
the relationship between attentional control and probability bias we found in Studies 1-3 and 
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the relationship between attentional control and emotion regulation described in the literature 
(Hofmann et al., 2008; Koole et al., 2011), we wanted to test whether difficulties in emotion 
regulation mediated the relationship between attentional control and probability bias.   
Method  
Participants and procedure.  Two hundred and thirty-nine undergraduates from the 
University of Kent participated for course credit.  Six were excluded for reporting a current 
psychiatric diagnosis other than an anxiety or affective disorder, leaving a final sample of 233 
(180 females, 52 males, 1 other; Mage = 19.73, SDage = 3.90; 176 identified as British).   
Measures.  Participants completed the STAI-T, BAIT, ACS, and BDI; then they 
completed the DERS, our probability bias measure from Study 1, and the MCSD.   
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS, Gratz & Roemer, 2004) 
consists of 36 items, intended to measure clinically relevant difficulties in emotion regulation.  
Participants indicate how often the items, including “When I’m upset, I have difficulty 
thinking about anything else” and “When I’m upset, I feel out of control”, apply to them on a 
1 (“Almost never, 0-10%”) to 5 (“Almost always, 91-100%”) scale.  The 36 items measure 
six factors: nonacceptance of emotional responses, difficulties engaging in goal-directed 
behaviour, impulse control difficulties, lack of emotional awareness, limited access to 
emotion regulation strategies, and lack of emotional clarity.  As with Study 3, we summed all 
the items to create a total overall score, which had good internal consistency (see Table 4).  
See the Supplementary Materials for basic results using the individual subscales.   
Results  
Correlations are presented in Table 4.  Once again, attentional control correlated 
negatively with probability bias, and with all the psychopathology measures including 
difficulties in emotion regulation.  Difficulties in emotion regulation showed strong positive 
correlations with all the psychopathology measures.   
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As with Study 3, we tested a mediation model to see whether attentional control’s 
relationship with probability bias was mediated by difficulties in emotion regulation, 
controlling for trait anxiety and depression.  There was a significant indirect effect of 
attentional control on probability bias via difficulties in emotion regulation, standardised β = 
-.03, 95% CI [-.069, -.003], but the direct effect of attentional control on probability bias was 
also significant, β = -.14, t (228) = -2.19, p = .03 (multicollinearity tolerances > 0.39).  This 
replicates Study 3’s finding that although difficulties in emotion regulation do partly explain 
the relationship between attentional control and probability bias, attentional control still 
significantly predicts probability bias even when emotion regulation, trait anxiety and 
depression are simultaneously controlled.   
Finally, we again checked whether attentional control moderated trait anxiety or 
depression’s relationships with probability bias.  For the model with trait anxiety, adding the 
interaction term did not improve model fit, R
2
 change = .001, Fchange (1, 229) = 0.22, p = .64, 
BF01 = 6.25.  For the model with depression, again adding the interaction term did not 
improve model fit, R
2
 change = .001, Fchange (1, 229) = 0.29, p = .59, BF01 = 5.56.   
Discussion  
Study 4 replicated the results of Study 3 very closely.  Attentional control again 
predicted probability bias independently of anxiety and depression, and this relationship was 
partly mediated by difficulties in emotion regulation.  Indeed, the βs for the indirect and 
direct effects were very similar for the two studies, despite the fact that they used different 
measures of emotion regulation.  This reinforces our conclusion that attentional control’s 
relationship with probability bias is real, and partly results from attentional control’s role in 
emotion regulation; it also supports the broader hypothesis that weak attentional control 
might increase risk of emotional disorder.   
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL AND PROBABILITY BIAS  18 
 
General Discussion  
In four studies, weak attentional control was consistently related to probability bias.  
While the literature suggests attentional control tends to moderate negative affect’s 
relationship with attentional bias, we have found that attentional control has its own 
independent relationship with probability bias.  This relationship is partly explained by the 
fact that people with weaker attentional control also have less effective emotion regulation, 
but we also found a direct relationship independent of emotion regulation.  Since cognitive 
biases help to cause or maintain high negative affect, anything which makes one more likely 
to show cognitive biases also makes one’s negative affect more likely to grow out of control.  
Together with the relevance of probability bias to worry, this reinforces the idea that weak 
attentional control is a risk factor for high negative affect and emotional disorders.   
Relationship Between Attentional Control and Probability Bias 
Across all studies we found a negative correlation between attentional control and 
probability bias, ranging from r = -.33 to -.46, meta-correlation = -.38, 95% CI [-.44, -.32].  
When trait anxiety and depression were controlled, this relationship remained significant 
ranging from β = -.13 to -.24.  Attentional control positively predicted the perceived 
probability of positive events, and negatively predicted the probability of negative events; 
these two correlations were very similar in size.  Although attentional control’s relationship 
with probability bias is not as strong as trait anxiety’s relationship with probability bias, it is 
strong enough to be clinically relevant (see also Supplementary Materials).   
One limitation of these studies is our use of a self-report measure of attentional 
control.  Most studies on attentional control and attentional bias have used the ACS, so we 
used the same scale to ensure our results would be comparable.  However, there is mixed 
evidence concerning the validity of the ACS (Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2014; 
Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg, & Bradley, 2013).  Quigley, Wright, Dobson, and Sears (2017) 
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recently claimed that this scale measures subjective beliefs about attentional control ability, 
more than the ability itself; more generally, people high in negative affect might tend to 
respond negatively to any question about themselves or their abilities, which would yield 
negative correlations between negative affect and attentional control, and between attentional 
control and probability bias.  This cannot account for our results, because we consistently 
found that attentional control predicted probability bias when trait anxiety and depression 
were controlled (adding social desirability as a further control variable also did not change 
this relationship).  This means attentional control’s relationship with probability bias is 
independent of any general response bias, other common-method biases (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), and any influence of general affect.  Since the ACS 
has shown some relationship with behavioural measures of attentional control (Judah et al., 
2014), the most parsimonious conclusion is that weak attentional control is linked to 
probability bias.  This conclusion could be further strengthened by a replication of these 
findings with the ACS presented first, to prevent its being biased by the affect scales.  Of 
course, replications using behavioural measures of attentional control would be extremely 
valuable.  Furthermore, experimental studies manipulating available attentional control 
resources would help to confirm whether weak attentional control directly causes a more 
negative probability bias.   
It should also be acknowledged that our samples included relatively few males.  Of 
course this is not unusual for psychology student samples, and the literature on probability 
biases has not revealed sex differences, but it would be useful to investigate these issues in 
samples of males, who tend to have lower negative affect.   
Mechanisms 
Why is weak attentional control related to probability bias?  We suggested above that 
attentional control is important for emotion generation and regulation, and so may help to 
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control estimates of, and responses to, potential risk.  This is complicated by the fact that 
people, on average, tend to think that positive events are more likely to occur than negative 
events.  To shed more light on this issue, we tertile-split our four samples by ACS score, and 
examined the probability bias scores of the highest and lowest tertiles.  For the four studies, 
the mean probability bias for the high-attentional control tertiles were -19.70 (SD = 27.38), -
18.14 (SD = 26.98), -21.80 (SD = 28.04), and -28.29 (SD = 31.50), meta-estimate of the mean 
= -21.67, 95% CI [-24.69, -18.66]; whereas the means for the low-attentional control tertiles 
were 0.80 (SD = 27.38), 8.46 (SD = 22.18), 1.51 (SD = 25.20), and -3.35 (SD = 31.52), meta-
estimate of the mean = 2.54, 95% CI [-0.44, 5.53].  In other words, the high-attentional 
control tertiles thought that positive events were more likely, whereas the low-attentional 
control tertiles thought that positive and negative events were roughly equally likely.  This 
might suggest that the above-mentioned positive bias is not automatic, and requires 
attentional control.  Future research must investigate whether the ‘default setting’ of healthy 
individuals is to perceive negative and positive events as being equally likely.   
Studies 3 and 4 found weak attentional control relates to probability bias partly 
because attentional control contributes to emotion regulation.  This was expected, given that 
attentional control has been implicated in avoiding distraction by emotional stimuli 
(Grimshaw, Kranz, Carmel, Moody, & Devue, 2018), restraining emotional expressions 
(Schmeichel et al., 2008), and positive reappraisal (Pe, Raes, & Kuppens, 2013).  On the 
other hand, a relatively strong direct effect of weak attentional control on probability bias, 
independent of emotion regulation, was also found.  Probability bias may occur when it is 
easier to think of reasons why negative events would happen relative to positive events (A. K. 
MacLeod et al., 1991); attentional control assists with memory search (Dalgleish et al., 2007), 
so perhaps higher-attentional control people are more able to bias their searches of episodic 
and semantic memory to generate more reasons for positive events.  Furthermore, the CERQ 
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and DERS both focus on negative emotions, but regulation of positive emotions is also 
important for emotional disorders (Carl, Soskin, Kerns, & Barlow, 2013) and, as discussed 
above, probability bias may be a more positive irrationality in healthy people.  Also, both 
scales concentrate on ‘response-focused’ regulation strategies (Gross, 1998), whereas more 
‘antecedent-focused’ regulation strategies, which are deployed proactively to protect from 
negative emotions, may be just as important for probability bias.  Studies with more 
comprehensive assessments of emotion regulation ability are needed to investigate this topic.   
Why No Interaction Between Attentional Control and Negative Affect?   
These studies found that attentional control and negative affect have independent 
relationships with probability bias; previous studies found that weak attentional control 
moderates the relationship between negative affect and attentional bias.  We suspect that 
attentional control may also independently predict attentional bias, but that this has been 
obscured in previous studies by the moderation effect.  The moderation may occur because 
attentional bias reflects a failure of selective attention (Eysenck et al., 2007), and weak 
attentional control necessarily exaggerates any such failure.  This does not happen with 
probability bias because it does not rely so much on attention.  Also, commonly-used 
attentional bias tasks are unreliable (Chapman, Devue, & Grimshaw, 2017; Waechter & 
Stolz, 2015; Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2015), which may obscure their relationships with 
attentional control.     
Conclusions 
Based on these studies, we conclude that attentional control’s role in cognitive biases 
is more complex, fundamental, and important than the existing literature would suggest.  Poor 
attentional control does not simply exaggerate biases related to negative affect, but can be 
independently related to them, and may well be a risk factor for emotional disorders.  
Unfortunately, attentional control is not particularly amenable to improvement by training, 
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but we hope that better understanding its role in cognitive biases and negative affect can 
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Table 1 
Bivariate Correlations, Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach’s Alphas for Study 1.   
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 M SD α 
1 – STAI-S .73***[.67, .78] .54***[.44, .62] .62***[.54, .69] -.28***[-.39, -.16] -.28***[-.39, -.16] -.35***[-.46, -.23] .29***[.17, .40] .39***[.28, .49] .11 [-.02, .23] 40.07 11.40 .93 
2 – STAI-T  .59***[.50, .67] .71***[.64, .77] -.35***[-.46, -.23] -.38***[-.48, -.27] -.52***[-.61, -.42] .41***[.30, .51] .57***[.48, .65] .09 [-.04, .22] 46.31 9.43 .89 
3 – BAIT   .60***[.51, .68] -.32***[-.43, -.20] -.23***[-.35, -.11] -.32***[-.43, -.20] .31***[.19, .42] .39***[.28, .49] .15*[.02, .27] 13.72 10.50 .93 
4 – BDI    -.38***[.27, .48] -.31***[-.42, -.19] -.39***[-.49, -.28] .43***[.32, .53] .49***[.39, .58] .13 [.00, .25] 15.68 11.66 .91 
5 – ACS     .31***[.19, .42] .26***[.14, .38] -.28***[-.39, -.16] -.33***[.21, .44] -.03 [-.16, .10] 48.35 8.17 .84 
6 – MCSD      .23***[.11, .35] -.23***[-.35, -.11] -.28***[-.39, -.16] -.13 [-.25, -.00] 49.46 4.76 .71 
7 – Probability (positive events)      -.34***[-.45, -.22] -.86***[-.89, -.82] -.07 [-.20, .06] 85.91 19.05 .93 
8 – Probability (negative events)       .78***[.73, .83] .15*[.02, .27] 75.81 15.72 .89 
9 – Probability bias        .13*[.00, .25] -10.10 28.57 - 
10 – Cost bias          -2.33 9.98 - 
 Note. 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001. N = 238.  STAI-S, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, state subscale; STAI-T, State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, trait subscale; BAIT, Beck Anxiety Inventory, trait version; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; ACS, Attentional Control Scale; 
MCSD, Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability.  The scores are not unusual for student samples, and suggest the sample was mildly anxious and 
depressed on average.  Square brackets show 95% confidence intervals.  
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Table 2 
 Bivariate Correlations, Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach’s Alphas for Study 2.   
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 M SD α 
1 – STAI-S .70***[.62, .77] .60***[.50, .69] .62***[.52, .70] -.41***[-.52, -.28] -.31***[-.44, -.17] -.39***[-.51, -.26] .35***[.22, .47] .42***[.29, .53] .14 [-.00, .28] .04 [-.11, .18] .01 [-.13, .15] -.02 [-.16, .13] -.02 [-.16, .13] 39.77 11.95 .94 
2 – STAI-T  .71***[.63, .78] .73***[.66, .79] -.46***[.34, .57] -.37***[-.49, -.24] -.48***[-.58, -.36] .44***[.32, .55] .53***[.42, .63] .05 [-.10, .19] .07 [-.08, .21] .01 [-.13, .15] -.04 [-.18, .11] .03 [-.12, .17] 46.20 9.66 .88 
3 – BAIT   .69***[.61, .76] -.29***[-.42, -.15] -.33***[-.45, -.20] -.39***[-.51, -.26] .47***[.35, .58] .49***[.37, .59] .13 [-.02, .27] .05 [-.10, .19] .02 [-.13, .16] -.02 [-.16, .13] .05 [-.10, .19] 14.54 10.03 .92 
4 – BDI     -.41***[-.52, -.28] -.36***[-.48, -.23] -.52***[-.62, -.41] .44***[.32, .55] .55***[.44, .64] .07 [-.08, .21] -.03 [-.17, .12] .01 [-.13, .15] .03 [-.12, .17] .10 [-.05, .24] 16.40 12.49 .92 
5 – ACS     .31***[.17, .44] .40***[.27, .52] -.41***[-.52, -.28] -.46***[-.57, -.34] -.19**[-.33, -.05] -.10 [-.24, .05] -.01 [-.15, .13] .06 [-.09, .20] -.05 [-.19, .10] 48.79 8.93 .86 
6 – MCSD       .22**[.08, .35] -.27***[-.40, -.13] -.28***[-.41, -.14] -.13 [-.27, .02] .07 [-.08, .21] -.03 [-.17, .12] -.07 [-.21, .08] -.13 [-.27, .02] 49.68 4.84 .73 
7 – Probability (positive, self)      -.54***[-.64, -.43] -.90***[-.92, -.87] -.20**[-.34, -.06] .09 [-.06, .23] .08 [-.07, .22] -.02 [-.16, .13] -.04 [-.18, .11] 84.17 16.13 .89 
8 – Probability (Negative, self)       .86***[.82, .89] .20**[.06, -.34] .16*[.02, .30] .27***[.13, .40] .05 [-.10, .19] .01 [-.13, .15] 77.02 14.17 .85 
9 – Probability bias (self)        .23**[.09, .36] .03 [-.12, .17] .10 [-.05, .24] .04 [-.11, .18] .03 [-.12, .17] -7.15 26.64 - 
10 – Cost bias (self)         -.07 [-.21, .08] .05 [-.10, .19] .08 [-.07, .22] .42***[.29, .53] -0.53 9.56 - 
11 – Probability (positive, peer)          -.21**[-.34, -.07] -.81***[-.85, -.75] -.38***[-.50, -.25] 92.62 12.93 .91 
12 – Probability (negative, peer)           .74***[.67, .80] .17*[.03, .31] 74.15 11.18 .85 
13 – Probability bias (peer)            .36***[.23, .48] -18.47 18.75 - 
14 – Cost bias (peer)             -0.79 8.25 - 
 Note. 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001. N = 185.  STAI-S, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, state subscale; STAI-T, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait subscale; BAIT, Beck Anxiety Inventory, trait 
version; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; ACS, Attentional Control Scale; MCSD, Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability.  The scores suggest the sample was mildly anxious and depressed on average.  Square brackets 
show 95% confidence intervals.  
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 Table 3 
Bivariate Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Study 3.   
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 M SD α 
1 – STAI-T .66***[.57, .73] .76***[.70, .81] -.47***[-.57, -.36] -.31***[-.43, -.18] -.62***[-.70, -.53] -.53***[-.62, -.42] .49***[.38, .59] .58***[.48, .67] 46.81 8.84 .88 
2 – BAIT  .61***[.52, .69] -.33***[-.45, -.20] -.22**[-.35, -.08] -.37***[-.48, -.24] -.26***[-.39, -.13] .37***[.24, .48] .35***[.22, .47] 13.28 9.88 .92 
3 – BDI   -.37***[-.48, -.24] -.21**[-.34, -.07] -.56***[-.65, -.46] -.35***[-.47, -.22] .36***[.23, .48] .40***[.28, .51] 16.09 11.63 .90 
4 – ACS    .36***[.23, .48] .47***[.36, .57] .34***[.21, .46] -.38***[-.49, -.26] -.41***[-.52, -.29] 47.85 8.09 .83 
5 – MCSD     .33***[.20, .45] .35***[.22, .47] -.24***[-.37, -.11] -.34***[-.46, -.21] 48.49 4.60 .71 
6 – CERQ      .44***[.32, .55] -.41***[-.52, -.29] -.48***[-.58, -.37] 114.18 14.85 .84 
7 – Probability (positive events)      -.54***[-.63, -.43] -.90***[-.92, -.87] 84.03 17.25 .91 
8 – Probability (negative events)       .85***[.81, .88] 73.43 13.81 .84 
9 – Probability bias        -10.61 27.29 - 
 Note. 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001.  N = 201.  STAI-T, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait subscale; BAIT, Beck Anxiety Inventory, trait 
version; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; ACS, Attentional Control Scale; MCSD, Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability; CERQ, Cognitive Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire.  The scores suggest the sample was mildly anxious and depressed on average.  Square brackets show 95% confidence 
intervals.   
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 Table 4 
Bivariate Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Study 4.   
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 M SD α 
1 – STAI-T .62*** [.53, .69] .71***[.64, .77] -.37***[-.48, -.25] -.21**[-.33, -.08] .70***[.63, .76] -.50***[-.59, -.40] .43***[.32, .53] .52***[.42, .61] 46.95 8.17 .85 
2 – BAIT   .67***[.59, .74] -.27***[-.39, -.15] -.05 [-.18, .08] .61***[.52, .69] -.26***[-.38, -.14] .39***[.28, .49] .35***[.23, .46] 12.97 10.36 .93 
3 – BDI   -.37***[-.48, -.25] -.17**[-.29, -.04] .65***[.57, .72] -.42***[-.52, -.31] .42***[.31, .52] .46***[.35, .56] 16.70 12.75 .92 
4 – ACS    .35***[.23, .48] -.45***[-.55, -.34] .36***[.24, .47] -.26***[-.38, -.14] -.35***[-.48, -.23] 48.14 8.36 .83 
5 – MCSD      -.28***[-.39, -.16] .22**[.09, .34] -.15*[-.27, -.02] -.20**[-.32, -.07] 49.11 4.72 .73 
6 – DERS      -.46***[-.56, -.35] .42***[.31, .52] .48***[.38, .57] 94.39 23.09 .94 
7 – Probability (positive events)      -.65***[-.72, -.57] -.93***[-.95, -.91] 86.70 19.43 .93 
8 – Probability (negative events)       .89**[.86, .91] 70.43 15.60 .87 
9 – Probability bias        -16.27 31.82 - 
 Note. 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001.  N = 233.  STAI-T, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait subscale; BAIT, Beck Anxiety Inventory, trait 
version; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; ACS, Attentional Control Scale; MCSD, Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability; DERS, Difficulties in 
Emotion Regulation Scale.  The scores suggest the sample was mildly anxious and depressed on average.  Square brackets show 95% confidence 
intervals.   
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Appendix: Items Used to Assess Probability Bias 
The probability bias measure used in all studies presented 20 positive and 20 negative events in a 
random order.  These events are listed below.  These events were tailored for UK students.  
Some are adapted from previous studies, including those of Butler & Mathews (1987) and Stöber 
(1997); others were created by us.   
The next exam you sit will be unusually hard 
Your best friend will grow bored of you, and begin spending more time with other friends 
You will be diagnosed with cancer in your lifetime 
You will lose or seriously damage your mobile phone in the next year 
You will become well-known for an outstanding accomplishment   
You will fail a course this year 
You will be happily married     
You will become very wealthy 
You will graduate in the top 30% of your year-group 
You will embarrass yourself at your next social event 
You will have a serious argument with your family in the next month 
You will be able to succeed in your next venture or goal 
You will lose someone you love in the next year 
You will be the victim of a violent crime 
You will be perceived well at the next party or social event you attend 
During your next exam, you will fail to read one of the questions carefully enough 
At some time in your life, you will spend many years alone 
You would win the lottery if you played regularly     
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You will get a first in all your courses for a term    
You will become very well-known in your industry 
You will have an exceptionally gifted child         
You will find “true love”     
You will be alive and healthy into old age 
You will be completely satisfied with your life 
You will be fired from your first job out of university 
You will greatly enjoy your next holiday 
You will find the perfect job right out of university 
You will become homeless 
You could get into any masters programme you wanted 
You will be seriously injured in a natural disaster  
Your friends would be there to support you if you had some crisis  
You will do much better than expected in your next exam 
Your family will always be very proud of you   
You will have a child with a severe birth defect 
You will be in a serious car accident in the next 5 years 
Tomorrow will be a wonderful day for you 
You will die before age 50 
You will fail an exam this term 
You will be mistreated by a lecturer or seminar leader 
If you borrowed a friend’s laptop, you would damage it accidentally 
 
